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ABSTRACT 
German firms pay out a lower proportion of their cash flows than UK and US firms. However, on a 
published  profits  basis,  the  pattern  is  reversed.  Company  law  provisions  and  accounting  policies 
account for these conflicting results. A partial adjustment model is used to estimate the implicit target 
payout ratio and the speed of adjustment of dividends towards a long run target payout ratio. We find 
that German firms do not base their dividend decisions on published earnings, but on cash flows. The 
reasons  for  the  use  of  a  cash  flow-based  payout  policy  are:  (i)  published  earnings  figures  do  not 
correctly  reflect  corporate  performance  as  German  firms  tend  to  retain  a  significant  part  of  their 
earnings to build up legal reserves, (ii) the conservative nature of German accounting policies, (iii) 
published earnings are subject to a higher degree of smoothing than cash flows. Regarding the speed of 
adjustment of dividends towards the long term target payout ratio, UK and US companies only slowly 
adjust their dividend policy whereas German are more willing to cut the dividend in the wake of a 
temporary decrease in profitability. This causes a higher degree of ‘discreteness’ in the dividends-per-
share time series as opposed to the ‘smoothness’ (i.e., frequent annual small adjustments in the dividend 
per share) observed in the US and the UK.  
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1. Introduction 
Lintner’s (1956) empirical observation that firms gradually adjust dividends in response to 
changes in earnings, has acquired the status of a stylized fact on corporate dividend policy.
1 
His  seminal  work  suggests  that  managers  change  dividends  primarily  in  response  to 
unanticipated and non-transitory changes in their firm’s earnings, and they have reasonably 
well-defined policies in terms of the speed with which they adjust dividends towards a long 
run target payout ratio. Empirical studies, such as Fama and Babiak (1968), confirm Lintner’s 
original findings. 
As most of the empirical evidence is on UK and US data, little is known about the dividend 
policy and the explanatory power of dividend models for the case of continental European 
firms. Whereas in Goergen et al. (2004) we explain changes and omissions in dividends, in 
this paper we estimate the empirical relation between dividends and earnings in Germany by 
applying Lintner’s ‘partial adjustment model’ and using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM-in-systems).  One  of  the  previous  studies  that  addressed  this  issue  is  Behm  and 
Zimmermann (1993). However, their results are based on a sample of the 32 largest German 
firms only. They estimate the Lintner model for the period 1962-88 and conclude that it 
reasonably fits both aggregate and individual firm data.  
We examine whether German firms have a long-term target payout ratio. In addition, we 
investigate whether the target payout ratio is based on published earnings or on cash flow. 
We also study how the dividend adjustment process takes place. This paper improves on 
earlier  research  by  using  a  more  advanced  estimation  methodology,  a  larger  and  more 
representative  sample,  a  longer  time  window  and  different  proxies  for  profitability. 
Specifically, we improve the methodology along the following lines. First, we use panel data 
on 221 industrial and commercial quoted firms for the ten-year period from 1984 to 1993. 
This sample covers more than 50 per cent of the German industrial and commercial quoted 
companies. The reason why we opt for this period is that it encompasses a five-year period of 
economic boom followed by an economic recession. Unlike earlier studies (e.g. Behm and 
Zimmermann  1993),  we  exclude  financial  companies  as  these  firms  may  have  different 
considerations in establishing their investment and dividend policies. Second, earlier studies 
on German dividend policy did not control for unobserved firm-specific effects which might 
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be correlated with other explanatory variables causing Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
Within-Groups estimators to be biased and inconsistent. We use the Generalized Method of 
Moments technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995). Finally, we do not only use published bottom line earnings as an 
explanatory variable but also cash flows which have the advantage that they are less subject 
to conservatism in German accounting methods (e.g., the legal requirement to add earnings to 
reserves). 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  the  next  section,  we  discuss  the  dividend  models 
estimated in previous studies. We continue in Section 3 with some institutional aspects such 
as  profit  transfers  from  a  subsidiary  to  its  parent  company  in  Germany,  dividends  on 
preference shares and German accounting policies. We then describe our data set and provide 
descriptive statistics in Section 4. In Section 5, we first discuss the relevant econometric 
issues.  We  then  report  the  econometric  results  and  present  some  tests  to  ascertain  the 
robustness of these results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Dividend Models 
Marsh and  Merton (1987: 3) argue  that  the  ‘controversy regarding  normative theories of 
dividends  [namely,  based  on  the  relaxation  of  the  assumptions  underlying  the  Miller-
Modigliani (1961) theorem of dividend irrelevance], has led empirical researchers to rely 
heavily  on  positive  approaches  to  specify  their  models’.  Lintner  (1956)  was  the  first  to 
propose a positive dividend-earnings model and his work laid the fundaments of the vast 
subsequent  dividend  literature.  He  conducted  interviews  with  28  carefully  selected  US 
companies to investigate the rationale behind their dividend policy. His fieldwork revealed 
considerable differences in dividend policies across companies but he also unveiled some 
common patterns. Marsh and Merton (1986) summarize these patterns as follows:  
(1) managers believe that firms should have some long term target payout ratio; 
(2) in the dividend decision, managers focus on the change in current payouts and not on the 
dividend level;  
(3) a change in dividends is usually triggered by a major unexpected and persistent change in 
earnings;   
(4) most managers try to avoid changing the dividends if there is a high probability that this 
dividend change may be reversed within one year or so.   4
Based upon these facts, Lintner (1956) formalizes corporate dividend behaviour as a partial 
adjustment model. For any year t, the target level of dividends, D
*
it for firm i, is related to 
current earnings, Eit, by a desired payout ratio ri: 
  D r E it i it
* =   (1) 
In any given year the firm will only partially adjust to the target dividend level. Hence, we 
have: 
  D D a c D D u it i t i i it i t it - = + - + - - ,
*
, ( ) 1 1   (2) 
where  ai  is  a  constant;  ci  is  the  speed-of-adjustment  coefficient,  with  0<ci£  1; 
D D D it i t it - = - , 1 D is  the  actual  change  in  the  dividend  and  ( )
*
, D D it i t - -1   is  the  desired 
change in the dividend. 
If  ai  =  0  and  ci  =  1,  the  actual  changes  in  dividends  coincide  with  the  desired changes. 
Conversely, if ci = 0, no changes in dividends towards the desired level are undertaken since 
the actual change at time t is the same as the one observed in the previous time period. The 
hypothesis that firms gradually adjust dividends in response to changes in earnings and thus 
apply dividend smoothing implies that the speed-of-adjustment coefficient ci is within the 
range 0<ci<1. Furthermore, a positive ai represents the management’s resistance to reduce 
dividends.  
The adjustment process (2) can be written as 
  it t i i it i i it u D c D c a D + - + + = -1 ,
* ) 1 (   (3) 
Now substitution of (1) into (3) gives 
  D a c rE c D u it i i i it i i t it = + + - + - ( ) , 1 1   (4) 
One obtains the following empirically testable equation: 
  D a b E c D u it i i it i i t it = + + - + - ( ) , 1 1   (5) 
with ri = bi / ci being the payout ratio and ci the speed of adjustment coefficient. 
Alternatively, the  empirically testable  equation (5) can be obtained by using an adaptive 
expectations model. In this model, current dividends are assumed to be a function of long run 
expected earnings: 
  D rE u it i it it = +
*   (6) 
As  the  expectations  variable  E
*
it  is  not  directly  observable,  we  assume  that  earnings 
expectations are formed according to the following process:   5





* ( ) - = - - - 1 1    (7) 
where  di  is  the  coefficient  of  earnings  expectations.  This  equation  signifies  that  the 
expectations  about  earnings  are  revised  each  period  by  a  fraction  di  of  the  discrepancy 
between the earnings observed in the current period and those that had been anticipated in the 
previous period. By substitution, equation (5) is obtained (but without the constant term). 
A combination of the adaptive expectations and partial adjustment models yields a different 
model. Here we assume that dividends follow the adjustment mechanism formulated in (3). In 
addition, target dividends are proportional to long run expected earnings 
  D rE it i it
* * =   (8) 
with long run expected earnings given by 





* ( ) - = - - - 1 1   (9) 
We finally obtain an empirically testable equation with a constant, Eit, Di,t-1 and Di,t-2. 
Fama and Babiak (1968) extend the partial adjustment model by including a lagged earnings 
variable. They assume that the process generating the annual earnings of firm i is as follows 
  E E v it i i t it = + + - ( ) , 1 1 l   (10) 
where vit is a serially uncorrelated error term. Target dividends are defined as in the partial 
adjustment model (1). A further assumption is that there is full adjustment of dividends to the 
expected earnings liEi,t-1, and partial adjustment to the remainder: 
  [ ] D D a c r E E D r E u it i t i i i it i i t i t i i i t it - = + - - + + - - - - , , , , ( ) 1 1 1 1 l l   (11) 
which rearranged, gives 
  D a c D c rE r c E u it i i i t i i it i i i i t it = + - + + - + - - ( ) ( ) , , 1 1 1 1 l   (12) 
yielding the following empirically testable equation 
  D a c D b E d E u it i i i t i it i i t it = + - + + + - - ( ) , , 1 1 1   (13) 
where bi = ci ri and di = ri li (1-ci). 
There has been extensive (early) empirical research confirming Lintner’s findings (amongst 
others: Fama and Babiak (1968), Pettit (1972), Watts (1973)).  
There are three different approaches to the econometric estimation of dividend behaviour. 
The first two are micro-econometric approaches. The first one uses time series for individual 
firms and allows for firm-specific slope coefficients. The second one uses a panel of data – a   6
cross-section of firms repeated over a short period – and imposes common slope coefficients. 
The  latter allows for restricted variation in the target dividend payout ratio across firms. 
Given that the length of our time series is limited to 10 years of data, we will opt for a panel 
data approach. The third approach is the macro-econometric model developed by Marsh and 
Merton  (1986).  They  assume  permanent  economic  earnings,  as  proxied  by  stock  market 
prices (and not accounting earnings), to be the fundamental determinant of dividends.  
3. The institutional framework in Germany 
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  provide  a  brief  overview  of  some  important  issues 
concerning German dividend policy.
2 The issues are: (i) ‘control agreements’ which may 
apply  to  firms  with  a  large  shareholder,  (ii)  preference  shares  which  earn  a  guaranteed 
dividend, (iii) share repurchases, and (iv) German accounting rules. 
Some quoted German companies have ‘control agreements’ with their parent company. There 
are two possible types of control agreements: a Profit and Loss Agreement (which we call 
PLA)  and  a  Subordination  of  Management  Agreement  (SMA).
3  An  SMA  requires  the 
controlling company to absorb any losses but the transfer of profit is optional. A PLA implies 
a transfer of both profits and losses to the controlling company. Hence, the pertinent question 
is whether companies with such agreements should be included in this study. 
We decide to exclude these firms from our analysis for two reasons. First, the rationale of 
these control contracts is to benefit from possible tax losses carried forward at the level of the 
subordinate company. The controlling company can then absorb these losses and offset them 
against its profits so as to reduce its tax bill, as in Germany, like the UK but unlike the US, 
the taxable profit is based on the accounts of the individual companies in the group. Hence, 
the amount transferred to the parent company is not a dividend, but is direct result from the 
effort to reduce the tax liability of the parent company. Second, financial reports are very 
difficult to interpret in these cases. Often the profit is not disclosed, but the amount (which 
may be positive or negative) that is transferred to the parent company as well as the dividend 
                                                 
2 Further details on the institutional settings can be found in chapter 5 of Correia et al. (2004) and 
Goergen et al. (2004). 
3 Both agreements require the approval of at least 75 per cent of the voting capital represented at 
general  meetings  of  both  the  controlling  and  subordinate  companies.  Note  that  the  existence  of  a 
controlling  shareholder  does  not  necessarily  imply  the  existence  of  either  PLA  or  SMA  type  of 
agreements.    7
per  share  paid  to  the  ‘free’  shareholders  (the  minority  shareholders  of  the  controlled 
company) is shown. One way to deal with this sample exclusion bias is to use consolidated 
accounts. If the parent firm is publicly quoted, the transfers from the subordinate firm to its 
parent company will be reflected in the parent firm’s financial report, and therefore these 
subordinate  firms  will  be  recorded  (indirectly)  in  our  sample.  This  is  one  reason  why 
consolidated accounts have been used in this study. The other reason relates to provisions 
concerning the profit distribution, to which we now turn. 
Paragraph  150  of  the  German  Stock  Corporation  Act  (AktG  §150)  regulates  the  profit 
distribution. The company has to build up a legal reserve from its profits in the balance sheet. 
The  annual  profit,  net  of  the  transfer  to  the  legal  profit  reserve,  is  then  the  basis  for 
distribution  according  to  the  provisions  of  AktG  §58,  which  basically  state  that  the 
management  board  and  the  supervisory  board,  without  consulting  the  shareholders,
4  can 
retain part, but no more than half, of the annual profits. In other words, this provision requires 
companies to pay out at least 50 per cent of their current profits as dividends. However, this 
is not the case for all companies as other requirements such as legal reserves and special 
provisions (such that the management board may be authorized to transfer up to 100 per cent 
of the year’s profit to profit reserves) in the articles of association of companies mitigate the 
impact of AktG §58.  
An  implication of these provisions  is  that  profits  shown  in group  accounts  are  generally 
larger than those shown in the unconsolidated, parent AG. Legally, when deciding on the 
dividend policy of the firm, the (parent’s) management only has to take into consideration the 
profit of the parent (unconsolidated) company. However, in practice, group accounts play a 
fundamental  role  in  the  dividend  payout decision. If the  holding  company’s  results  were 
substantially  lower  than  the  group’s  accounts,  shareholders  could  demand  either  an 
explanation  or  a  higher dividend. Thus, for the  purposes  of  this study, we opted for the 
group’s profit as the profit measure.
5 
Preference shares are frequently issued by German corporations (see chapter 5 of Correia et 
al. (2004)). In almost all cases, they carry no voting rights,
6 but are entitled to a minimum 
                                                 
4 As long as there is no control agreement between the controlling and subordinate companies. 
5 Harris et al. (1994) show that consolidation increases the value relevance of accounting measures for 
German companies. 
6 Except in a few cases where the term preference share refers to shares with multiple-voting rights 
rather than to a preferential dividend.   8
cumulative preferred dividend. In general, if this dividend is not paid during two consecutive 
years then the preference shares become voting shares. Preference shares are not only given 
priority in terms of the dividend they receive, but also receive an excess dividend of usually 
between DM1 to DM2 per share.
7 These stock corporation provisions basically ensure that 
firms which are fully controlled by one or a few shareholders and which have issued quoted 
preference shares, do not adopt dividend policies that favour the large shareholders at the 
expense of the minority non-voting shareholders. 
In Germany, public corporations are generally not allowed to buy their shares back (AktG §§ 
71-71e). There are a few exceptions. For example, a company can acquire its own shares up 
to a total of 10 per cent of its share capital if this repurchase is necessary to avoid serious 
damage to the company (i.e., loss of property or assets), or with the intention to offer them to 
the employees of the company. 
Finally, one further issue. German accounting is often considered to be particularly deficient 
in the information disclosed to investors. The German system has traditionally encouraged a 
certain degree of conservatism (see Harris et al. (1994) for an overview of the system). In 
particular, the three following factors contribute to a conservative bias in the profit figure 
disclosed. First, there is some degree of prudence in terms of asset valuation, as the imparity 
principle requires unrealized losses to be recognized but not unrealized gains. Second, as a 
consequence of the link established by the AktG §58 (see above) between dividends and 
earnings, managers have incentives not to report earnings that attain a desired dividend policy 
because  higher  reported  earnings  may  create  shareholder  pressure  for  higher  dividends.
8 
Third, the existence of pension provisions may also account for a certain downward bias in 
the published profit figure. We will shortly come back to this point. 
In the light of conservative accounting information, we provide an alternative measure of 
corporate  profitability.  We  define  cash  flows  as  zero  distribution  profits,  gross  of 
depreciation and changes in long term provisions. As this definition merits an explanation, 
                                                 
7 In other words, where there are dual-class shares of this type, distributed profits are first accorded to 
preference shares and in case there is current profit left, ordinary shares start to receive a dividend. 
Once the amount paid to ordinary shares reaches the amount accorded to preference shares and if there 
is  further  profit  left,  the  marginal  increase  in  dividends paid is  the same  for  both  types  of  shares 
although the preference shares generally receive a small premium in excess of the ordinary shares. 
8 Although one should bear in mind all these difficulties when interpreting German accounts, there is no 
empirical evidence that reported earnings in Germany have less value relevance than those in other 
countries. For example, Harris et al. (1994) argue that German reported earnings have informational 
content similar to those of the US.   9
we briefly discuss (i) zero distribution profits and dividend related taxation, (ii) depreciation 
and (iii) pension and other provisions.  
(i) The German tax system affects measured profits and dividend payout ratios.
9 If dividends 
are  taxed  differently than retained earnings,  then  corporate tax  liabilities  are sensitive  to 
dividend distributions. The convention that has been used in this case is to measure profits by 
zero dividend distribution profits and these are defined as: 











  (14)  
where td  accounts for the tax rate on dividends distributed, tc  for the tax rate on retained 
profits, D(1-tc) are net dividends (i.e., dividends net of tax), D/(1-td) are gross dividends and 
R are earnings retentions. To understand how dividends in Germany affect tax liabilities, 
assume that a firm makes a loss. If it omits its dividend, then there will be no tax liability. 
However, if it decides to pay out a dividend despite its loss, then there will be a tax liability 
(equal to td times the dividend distribution).  
(ii) Depreciation is included as it is merely a bookkeeping transaction that does not involve 
cash inflows or outflows.  
(iii)  Long  term  provisions  are  defined  as  the  sum  of  provisions  for  pensions,  and  other 
provisions. The inclusion of pension provisions in the calculation of the cash flow deserves a 
comment because, e.g., in the UK this item is not significant. In one respect, the pension 
provisions should be regarded as a liability (from the company towards the employees) and 
therefore it should not be part of retentions. However, in our view, there is a strong case for 
considering it as a form of cash flow. Edwards and Fischer (1994, Table 3.4, p.66) report 
that, between 1970 and 1989, this amount accounted for approximately 6 per cent of the non-
financial  enterprise  sector  internally  generated  funds.  The  authors  also  argue  that  firms 
frequently have a high degree of discretion over the way in which pension provisions are 
invested. This is another reason why the bottom line profit figure may be so conservative in 
Germany. Therefore, we opt for the inclusion this item in the cash flow figure. The item 
‘other provisions’ is net of tax provisions, such as deferred taxation. 
                                                 
9 See Mayer and Alexander (1990) for a more detailed discussion of the issue.   10
4. Sample and Data Description 
4.1 Sample 
We select all of the 221 industrial and commercial firms that are quoted in at least one of the 
eight  German  Stock  Exchanges  (GSE),  and  for  which  there  are  at  least  five  years  of 
accounting data available over the ten-year period from 1984 to 1993. The reason why we 
choose this period is that it corresponds to a five-year period of economic growth followed by 
a period of economic slow down. Thirteen firms leave the stock market and go private, six go 
bankrupt, five are taken over and two put in place a ‘control agreement’ during the period of 
analysis. Thirty-six firms obtain a listing in a year after 1984, but all sample firms are quoted 
in  1989.  Overall,  the  sample  consists  of  an  unbalanced  panel  data  of  2098  firm-year 
observations (see Table 1). 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Accounting  data  are  collected  from  Saling  Aktienführer,  an  annual  publication  which 
provides information on balance sheet and profit and loss account items, historical data on 
equity raised on the stock exchanges, shareholdings, share prices, date of first quotation, etc. 
From this source, the following data are gathered for the ten-year period 1984-93: published 
after-tax  earnings,  depreciation,  changes  in  pension  provisions  and  other  provisions, 
dividends per share for both preference and ordinary shares, and the number of ordinary and 
preference shares at the end of the accounting year to which the dividend per share refers. 
The dividend per share figures are adjusted for share splits. 
4.2 Definitions and data issues 
We  use  gross  dividends,  defined  as  cash  dividends  gross  of  corporation  tax  levied  on 
dividend distributions. Preference shares are often issued on the German Stock Exchanges: in 
20 per cent of our sample (44 cases out of a total of 221), preferred stock was listed in at least 
one  year  during  the  period  1984-93.  To  account  for  dividends  on  preferred  stock,  we 
calculate a weighted average of the dividend paid on ordinary and preference shares. The 
weights consist of the ratios of the share capital issued as preference shares and ordinary 
shares, respectively, divided by the total market value of the total equity capital outstanding.    11
The weighted average dividend per share is hence calculated as follows. Let NT be the total 
number  of  shares  outstanding,  No  the  number  of  ordinary  shares,  and  Np  the  number  of 
preference shares. Thus, NT = No+Np. Moreover, let DPSo be the dividend per share paid on 
ordinary  shares,  and  DPSp  the  dividend  per  share  paid  on  preference  shares,  then  the 
weighted average dividend per share (WDPS) equals: 
  WDPS
DPS N DPS N
N




  (15) 
Using this formula, the weighted total dividend per share exceeds the dividend per ordinary 
share by approximately 4.5 per cent.  
 
UK studies typically consider only dividends on ordinary shares (see, e.g., Bond et al. (1996), 
Edwards et al. (1986)). Even for Germany, the issue of dividends on preferred equity may be 
less empirically relevant in the context of panel data estimations because the movements in 
dividends per share are equal for the two classes of shares in virtually all our sample firms. In 
other  words,  when  dividends  per  ordinary  share  increase,  for  example,  the  dividend  per 
preference share increases by a similar percentage. Only in 3 German firms (out of the 44 
with preference shares), the change in dividends per ordinary share was different from the 
change  per  preference  share.  Furthermore,  the  change  is  only  different  in  situations  of 
dividend omissions  or dividend initiations, which is consistent with the fact that there is 
generally a dividend premium paid on preference shares. To conclude, our data suggest that 
the degree of flexibility in choosing the level of dividends on preference shares is similar to 
the one on ordinary shares. 
 
A  striking fact is the high incidence of ‘specially designated dividends’ paid by German 
corporations.  We  find  that  such  payments  occurred  in  191  of  the  2,098  firm-year 
observations, i.e., 9 per cent of the whole sample. These special dividends predominantly 
reflect shifts in the dividend policy rather than transitory increases in dividends and earnings. 
Brickley (1983), who studies the dividend payouts and earnings of a sample of US firms in 
the year following the announcement of special dividends, also subscribes to this view. In 10 
firm-years, we observe large one-off payments associated with either ‘special anniversaries’, 
or  with  sales  of  subsidiaries  (in  one  case),  or  with  distributions  of  reserves  previously 
accumulated  at  a  different  rate  of  taxation.  The  fundamental  problem  with  these  large 
payments  is  one  of  timing,  i.e.,  to  which  accounting  years  should  these  payments  be 
allocated? As we do not have enough information allowing us to allocate these payments to 
specific  accounting  years,  we  exclude  these  payments  (as  do  Behm  and  Zimmermann 
(1993)).   12
Two earnings figures are employed: (a) after-tax earnings as published in the annual reports, 
and (b) cash flows defined as zero distribution earnings gross of depreciation and changes in 
provisions.
10 Both measures of earnings were divided by the number of shares outstanding at 
the end of each accounting year to obtain a per-share figure. 
We  use  consolidated  data  for  the  following  reasons.  First,  the  use  of  consolidated  data 
ensures  that the  fact that we exclude  firms  under ‘control agreements’ does not create a 
sample exclusion bias. These firms are indirectly included in our data via the accounts of the 
quoted parent company if the latter is in our sample. Second, the dividend policy of the 
parent company is, in practice, determined after consideration of the annual consolidated 
accounts. However, a problem arises from working with consolidated accounts. We have 14 
sample firms that are owned by other corporations which, in turn, are also in our sample. 
Such a double-counting issue may create a bias in our estimations. A typical example is Renk 
AG, who was owned by MAN AG over our sample period. The size of these 14 firms is 
usually very small compared to their parent companies. The average market capitalization of 
Renk AG is 8 per cent of the market capitalization of the average sample firm, and only 3 per 
cent of the market capitalization of MAN AG (which is 3 times as large as the average listed 
firm).  We  will  investigate  whether  the  double-counting  problem  biases  our  results,  by 
performing a re-estimation excluding these 14 firms. 
We use the Commerzbank Industry Classification and classify all 221 firms into nine industry 
categories. As a proxy measure for size, we calculate the market capitalization for all firms 
on an annual basis by averaging the market capitalization at the end of each quarter.
11 
4.3 Some descriptive statistics 
Some descriptive statistics  of  the dividends, earnings and cash flow series for the whole 
period are summarized in Table 2. A first striking result is that published earnings account for 
only 25 per cent of the cash flow. Hence, the mean dividend payout ratio on a published 
earnings basis is significantly higher than the equivalent ratio on a cash flow basis: 86 and 
                                                 
 
10  Behm and Zimmermann (1993) use ‘net profits’, a figure that is suggested by the German Financial 
Analysts Association. However, data on net earnings are not available for all firms in our sample and 
negative ‘net profits’ are not reported.  
11  As for 76 firm-year observations, the ordinary shares are not quoted whereas the preference shares 
are, we multiply the total number of ordinary and preference shares by the price of the listed preference 
share.    13
21.4 per cent, respectively. This also suggests that the published earnings figure is rather 
conservative. Behm and Zimmermann (1993) find similar figures for a sample of 32 major 
quoted German firms. Table 2 also reveals that the dividend per share figure has a coefficient 
of variation (i.e., defined as the standard deviation of the series over the mean) of 0.75, which 
is lower than the coefficient of variation of published earnings (1.07) and cash flows (0.95). 
The variance ratio of dividends over published earnings equals 0.36 (=9.2
2/15.3
2) and the one 
of dividends over cash flows equals approximately 0.03. This provides a rough estimate of 
the degree of ‘dividend smoothing’ (see Goergen et al. (2004) for more details). Cash flows 
have a slightly lower coefficient of variation than published earnings but the variance ratio of 
published earnings over cash flows equals 0.079 providing some evidence of what we can 
call ‘published earnings smoothing’. As these figures per share may be influenced by firm 
size,  we  also  show  the  correlation  coefficient  between  firm  size,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
dividends, published earnings, and cash flows per share, on the other. We observe that cash 
flows per share are positively correlated with firm size (coefficient of 21.1 per cent). The 
correlation coefficients between size, and dividends per share and published earnings are 
smaller, but are also positively related (8.3 and 14.7 per cent, respectively). 
An important stylized fact on German dividends is the high incidence of unchanged dividends 
every year. As Table 3 reports, almost 51 per cent of the firm-year observations in our sample 
correspond to cases of maintained dividends. The frequency distribution of dividend changes 
during 1984-93 looks normal with the average firm changing its dividends per share every 
two years. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 3 shows that approximately 11 per cent of the firm-years correspond to cases where 
there are zero dividend payouts in at least two consecutive years. The table also reveals that 
in 21 per cent of observations (i.e., 203/955), the zero dividend payout is maintained. The 
proportion of dividend cuts (including omissions) is approximately 16 per cent of the total 
sample. Approximately 30 per cent of the dividend cuts are dividend omissions, suggesting 
that  in  German  firms  dividend  policy  is  not  very  rigid.  Only  five  firms  do  not  pay  any 
dividends  throughout  the  whole  sample  period,  whereas  116  firms  always  pay  a  strictly 
positive dividend (not reported in the table) 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]   14
 
In Table 4 we show the characteristics of the distribution of changes in the dividends per 
share.  We  observe  that  the  mean  increase  and  cut  (excluding  dividend  initiations  and 
omissions,  respectively)  are  almost  identical  in absolute value  (31  per cent). Half of  the 
dividend cuts amount to 25 per cent or more, whereas the median of increases is lower, at 15 
per cent. To summarize, we observe: (i) a high frequency of changes in dividends per share; 
(ii) a frequent occurrence of dividend omissions and zero dividend payout policies; (iii) some 
evidence of dividend smoothing; and (iv) the median of dividend cuts is higher than the 
median of dividend increases.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
5. Estimation and results 
Our basic, empirically testable, model is based on the discussion in Section 2: 
  it i t it t i it V YEAR ￿ D D + + + + = - h b a 1 ,   (16) 
where Dit, Di,t-1 are the dividend per share at time t and t-1, respectively, for firm i; Pit is 
earnings or cash flow per share at time t for firm i; YEARt are time dummies that control for 
the impact of time on the dividend behaviour of all sample firms; hi is a firm-specific effect 
to allow for unobserved influences on the dividend behaviour of each firm and is assumed to 
remain constant over time. There are several possible sources of these unobserved influences. 
For instance, this firm-effect can be viewed as a firm’s component of the ‘normal’ signalling 
constraint which quoted firms may have to satisfy; Vit. is a disturbance term. 
 
5.1 Estimation 
In this subsection we briefly describe the estimation techniques used (more details can be 
found on pp.103-106 of Correia et al. (2004)). In dynamic panel data models such as (16 with 
a  large  cross-section  of firms  and  a  small number  of  time-series observations, there  is  a 
potential estimation  problem  because  the  earnings variable, Pit, is likely to be correlated 
across firms with the firm-specific effect, hi. In addition, the lagged dependent variable is 
most likely to be correlated with these firm-specific effects. Thus, if we estimate (16) using 
OLS, the estimators are inconsistent and biased because cov(Di,t-1,hi) ¹ 0 and cov(Pit,hi) ¹ 0 
(Hsiao  1986).  A  Within-Groups  estimator  (WG),  i.e.  OLS  on  the  equation  with  each 
observation expressed as the deviation from the time mean, will eliminate the firm-specific   15
effect. However, the estimators will still be inconsistent and biased since cov(Di,t-1,Vi.) ¹ 0, 
where Vi. is the deviation from the time mean of the disturbance term Vit (Nickell 1981). 
To obtain consistent estimators, the model is first-differenced to eliminate the fixed-effect, hi: 
  ( ) ) (
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  (17) 
We then use an instrumental variable approach (Anderson and Hsiao 1981) to estimate (17) 
as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Provided there is no serial correlation in the disturbance Vit, we can use all lagged values of 
the dependent variable, i.e., Di,t-2, Di,t-3, ....Di,1 as valid instruments in the first-differenced 
equation.  Similarly,  allowing  for  a  possible  correlation  between  Pit  and  Vit,  only  lagged 
values dated t-2 and earlier will be used as instruments (Arellano and Bond 1991). In other 
words, we allow for the endogeneity of the regressors as it is likely that shocks affecting 
dividend  choices  may  also  affect  measured  earnings  and  cash  flows.  Arellano  and  Bond 
(1991) develop a Generalized Method of Moments technique in-first-differences to obtain 
such an estimator.  
A further refinement is developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998).  Their  Monte  Carlo  analysis  shows that  in  dynamic  panel data models  where  the 
autoregressive parameter (i.e. a in (16)) is moderately large and the number of time series 
observations  is  moderately  small,  the  GMM-first-differences-IV  estimator  is  poorly 
behaved.
12 In this case, lagged levels of the series provide weak instruments for the first-
differenced  equation.  The  authors  propose  a  linear  GMM  estimator  in  a  system  of  first-
differenced and levels equations that offers significant efficiency gains in situations where 
the  GMM-first-differences  performs  poorly.  The  resulting  linear  estimator  uses  lagged 
differences of the series as instruments for the equations in levels, in addition to lagged levels 
of the series as instruments for equations in first differences. Specifically, it uses 
(Di,t-1– Di,t-2) and (Pi,t-1 -Pi,t-2) as additional instruments in the levels equations (16), under the 
assumption  that  these  differences  are  uncorrelated  with  the  firm-specific  effect,  hi,  even 
                                                 
 
12 Both one step and two step versions of GMM first-difference showed a downward finite sample bias.   16
though  the  levels  of  the  series  are  correlated  with  hi.  We  call  this  technique  GMM-in-
systems.  
We proceed as follows. We estimate the basic model, and other variations so to include other 
lag structures. We report the main results relating to the models explained in Section 2, but 
also estimate a model based on (9), showing that the coefficient of Di,t-2 is neither individually 
nor jointly statistically significant. For all these specifications, we report the results of each 
of  the  four  estimation  techniques  described  above:  OLS  in  levels,  Within-Groups  (WG), 
GMM-in-first-differences  (GMM(DIF))  and  GMM-in-systems  (GMM(SYS)).
13  This 
procedure shows us how much the size of the speed of adjustment coefficient (i.e., 1-a) and 
the  one  of  the  implicit  target  payout  ratio  (i.e.,  b/(1-a))  varies  across  the  different 
estimation techniques. In addition, it will also be useful to compare our results with those of 
previous studies which have mainly used the basic OLS-estimation (see pp.95-96 of Correia 
da Silva et al. (2004) for a discussion of alternative estimation techniques). 
5.2 Results 
We discuss three sets of results: (i) those corresponding to the published earnings model; (ii) 
those obtained from the cash flow model; and (iii) those derived from a model which includes 
earnings and cash flows simultaneously.  
 
The  parameter  estimates  obtained  from  the  published  earnings  model  (equation  17)  are 
reported in Table 5. The coefficient on the lagged dividends, a, varies from 0.42, obtained in 
the WG estimation, to 0.79, when OLS in levels is used. Thus, the speed of adjustment (1-a) 
lies within a broad a range, namely [0.21, 0.58]. Clearly, a speed of adjustment coefficient of 
a magnitude of 0.58 makes less economic sense than a coefficient of 0.25 (from GMM(SYS)) 
because, on average, 50 per cent of our sample firms do not change their dividends and, when 
they change it, the average percentage increases and decreases are modest (see Tables 3 and 
4). This suggests that some estimation techniques yield incorrect results which may be the 
consequence of biases introduced by unobserved influences on the dividend behaviour of 
individual  firms.  Table  5  also  shows  that  the  GMM(DIF)  and  GMM(SYS)  estimation 
procedures yield realistic speed of adjustment estimates, while the GMM(DIF)-estimates may 
be biased downward compared to the GMM(SYS)-estimates (for the econometric arguments 
                                                 
13 Our estimation procedure is implemented using the Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) programme (Arellano 
and Bond 1988) which operates under Gauss.   17
above). The Sargan test on the validity of the instrument set consistently rejects instruments 
dated t-2, possibly due to the fact that the measurement errors are serially uncorrelated.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Another useful statistic is the implicit target payout ratio (b/(1-a)), which can be calculated 
from Table 5. The target payout ratio varies from 15 per cent (specification (d)) to 41 per cent 
(specification (a)) and is significantly lower than the observed payout ratio which amounts to 
86 per cent
14. This is true irrespective of the technique used to obtain the estimators. In other 
terms, biases due to fixed-effects cannot account for the discrepancy between implicit and 
observed dividend payout ratios. Using GMM(SYS), which econometrically ought to give a 
parameter estimate closer to the true observed value, one obtains an implicit payout ratio of 
28 per cent (specification (g)) and 25 per cent (specification (h)). Thus, it seems that for 
German  firms  the  dividend  decisions  are  not  based  on  long  term  target  dividend  payout 
ratios. 
How  do  our estimates of  the  speed  of  adjustment  and the implicit dividend payout ratio 
perform in comparison to the dividend literature? In previous studies, the estimated speed of 
adjustment is usually  substantially lower than the  observed  one.  For instance, Behm and 
Zimmermann  (1993) test the partial adjustment model for a sample of 32 major German 
quoted firms during 1962 and 1988. Using an OLS regression on pooled data, the authors 
find that a specification based on current earnings only has a speed of adjustment of 0.26. 
Including lagged earnings into the model as well reduces the speed of adjustment coefficient 
to 0.13. The implicit target payout ratio of 48 per cent in the Behm and Zimmerman study is 
also lower than the observed ratio of 58 per cent (both figures are on a net basis). For US 
studies, the estimated average speed of adjustment is also lower than the observed one. For 
example, the one estimated by Lintner was approximately 30 per cent with a target payout 
ratio  of  50  per  cent  of  earnings.  Lintner’s  implicit  target  payout  ratio  seems  to  be 
substantially  higher  than  ours  in  specification  (h).  Fama  and  Babiak  (1968)  find  that  a 
specification, in which the constant term is suppressed and the level of earnings for t-1 is 
added, provides the best prediction of dividends. Specification (h) includes such a lagged 
earnings variable but the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 15 per cent level. 
                                                 
14 Table 2 shows that the target payout ratio is 86%; dividends per share are DM 12.3 and earnings per 
share amounts to DM 14.3.   18
Note also that Fama and Babiak (1968) find an average speed of adjustment of approximately 
0.37, slightly higher than Lintner’s. 
To summarize, the estimations of the published earnings model for German firms suggest that 
dividend decisions are not based on long term target payouts, as originally hypothesized by 
Lintner (1956). This view is supported by implicit payout ratios that deviate substantially 
from  observed  payout  ratios.  An  alternative  explanation  is  that  target  payout  ratios  are 
expressed in another profitability measure, for example, cash flows. This would be consistent 
with the fact that the published earnings figure is likely to be conservative as German firms 
withhold  part  of  their  earnings  to  build  up  (legal)  reserves.  Moreover,  it  would  also  be 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms adjust slowly to cash flows rather than earnings. We 
investigate this alternative view by re-estimating our model using a cash flow basis.  
Table 6 shows that a cash flow model yields parameter estimates which are much closer to 
reality. Specifications (g) and (h) based on the GMM(SYS) estimation technique give a speed 
of adjustment of 0.33 and 0.26, respectively, similar to the speed of adjustment obtained in 
the published earnings model. Unlike the earnings model, the cash flow model gives a more 
realistic (implicit) target payout ratio. This target payout is 19.6 per cent (specification (g)), 
which is comparable to the mean (or observed) payout ratio of 21.4 per cent.
15 Notice also, 
that the coefficient on the lagged cash flows variable is now statistically significant (at the 7 
per cent level). 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
When inspecting the results obtained by simultaneously including published earnings and 
cash  flows  (see  Table  7), we find that the explanatory power of the cash flow variables 
disappears, but that the one of published earnings remains. This result is true irrespective of 
the estimation technique. Therefore, although the cash flow model seems economically more 
meaningful (see Section 3) and is better at explaining the dividend policy of German firms, it 
is puzzling that earnings dominate in the combined model. One possible reason for this may 
be  published  earnings  smoothing  (relative  to  cash  flow)  as  well  as  dividend  smoothing. 
Consequently, the true correlation between dividends and cash flows that are not smoothed 
                                                 
15 In Table 2, the dividends per share are DM 12.3 and the cash flow per share amounts to DM 57.6, 
giving a cash flow payout ratio of 21.4 per cent.  
   19
may be higher than that between dividends and smoothed earnings. We further investigate 
this  issue  by  regressing  current  published  earnings  on  lagged  published  earnings  using 
GMM(SYS).  We  find  a  coefficient  of  persistence  (i.e.,  the  autoregressive  parameter)  of 
0.682. We then replicate this experiment for cash flows and find a coefficient of 0.321. This 
suggests  more  persistence  in  published  earnings  than  in  cash  flows,  consistent  with  our 
descriptive statistics. 
Regarding the speed of adjustment of dividends towards the long term target payout ratio, 
Germany is somewhat in between two extremes. On the one hand, companies from Anglo-
American  countries  only  slowly  adjust  their  dividend  policy.  For  instance,  the  partial 
adjustment model by Short et al. (2002) shows that UK firms have a long term target payout 
ratio, which is positively correlated to institutional ownership and negatively to managerial 
ownership. In contrast, ‘emerging markets firms often have a target payout ratio but they are 
generally less concerned with volatility in dividends over time and, consequently, dividend 
smoothing over time is less important’ (Glen et al. 1995: 24). For instance, Adaoglu (2000) 
shows that the companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange continue to follow unstable 
dividend policies even after the regulation that required that half of the earnings had to be 
distributed as cash dividends was abandoned.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
5.3 Alternative Specifications  
In  order  to  verify  the  robustness  of  the  above  results,  we  first  consider  the  impact  of 
differences in dividend practice by industry. We estimate the earnings and cash flow models 
including 9 industry dummies, but the Wald test of the joint significance of these industries is 
rejected.  Moreover,  the  coefficients  of  all  the  other  explanatory  variables  (cash  flows, 
published earnings or lagged dividends) remain nearly unchanged.  
To control for inflation, we deflate all variables by the Consumer Price Index as reported in 
the monthly bulletin of the Deutsche Bundesbank. We compute dividends, published earnings 
and cash flows at constant prices of 1985 and re-estimate the models of Section 4.2. We 
conclude that the results do not alter substantially by correcting for inflation.
16 An inspection 
                                                 
16 For example, the GMM(SYS) point estimates for model (h) in Table 5 are 0.761 for the coefficient of 
the lagged dividends, 0.084 for current earnings and -0.028 for the coefficient of lagged earnings,   20
of the dividend per share time series in real and nominal terms shows that almost all firms 
change the real dividend per share, as opposed to the nominal dividend which is characterized 
by a higher discreteness. However, in terms of cross-sectional variation there is not much 
further  information  added  to  the  model  by  estimating it  at constant prices. We conclude 
therefore that there is no strong case for using real instead of nominal dividend and earnings 
figures in the estimations. 
Next, we scale our variables in line with the suggestion by Bond et al. (1996) who argue that 
the presence of firms with very different sizes may be a source of heteroskedasticity in the 
point estimates. There are several possible variables one can employ to scale dividends and 
earnings, e.g. total assets, sales, and market capitalization. We use market capitalization at the 
beginning of the sample period and the basic empirically testable equation (16) becomes: 






























                                   (18) 
where TD stands for total dividends and TP is total published earnings or cash flows. Table 8 
reports a summary of the results for the scaled model (18) and its variations including the use 
of lagged earnings and cash flows. The main observation from this table is that the patterns 
and the point estimates do not differ significantly from the non-scaled models. We still obtain 
a cash flow model that produces an implicit payout ratio that is close to the observed ratio, a 
published earnings model that yields implicit parameters that differ substantially from the 
observed  figures  and  a  high  autoregressive  parameter.  Finally,  a  model  with  published 
earnings and cash flows simultaneously shows a similar pattern to the non-scaled model: cash 
flows  are  no  longer  statistically  significant  determinants  of  dividends.  The  two  GMM 
techniques yield consistent estimators in the scaled model.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Bond et al. (1996) estimate a specification similar to (a) of Table 8 for a sample of 1,218 UK 
industrial  and  commercial  quoted  companies.  They  estimate  a  specification  with  lagged 
dividends  and  current  and  lagged  earnings  using  a  GMM(DIF)  technique.  They  find  an 
autoregressive parameter of the magnitude of 0.69, yielding a speed of adjustment of 0.31. 
This compares with the parameter of 0.71 that we obtain in specification (a), inducing a 
                                                                                                                                             
compared to 0.755, 0.095 and -0.034, respectively, obtained for the same model but at current prices. 
Similarly insignificant differences are found in the estimation of the cash flow model and the model that 
tests the joint inclusion of cash flows and published earnings.   21
speed of adjustment of 0.29. In other words, we find a somewhat lower speed of adjustment 
for German firms compared to UK data. This result is also similar to the one we find for the 
non-scaled model (see Section 4.2). Bond et al. (1996) also report an implicit cash flow 
payout ratio of 33.2 per cent compared to ours of 28 per cent (specification (d)).  
As the inclusion of the 14 firms that are controlled by other listed German sample firms may 
create  a  bias  due  to  double-counting  (see  Section  3.2),  we  eliminate  these  firms  and re-
estimate specifications (c) and (d) of Table 8 for a sample of 207 firms. We use the same 
instrument  set  and  find  no  significant  changes  in  the  point  estimates.  For  example,  the 
autoregressive  parameter  was  0.708  in  the  cash  flow  model  and  0.734  in  the  published 
earnings model. Moreover, current cash flows had a coefficient of 0.081 and lagged values a 
coefficient of ￿0.035.  
Finally, we discuss the methodological problems related to the fact that we observe (a) a high 
volatility  in  the  dividend  per  share  time  series  (compared  to  that  of  Anglo-American 
companies), and (b) a high number of firms which do not change the dividend and have zero 
dividend payout policies in at least two consecutive years (see Section 3.3). To investigate 
the  influence  of  these  characteristics  of  the  dividend  per  share  series  on  the  size  of  the 
autoregressive parameter, we estimate the basic model using the GMM(SYS) technique for a 
sample that excludes those firms which did not change the dividend per share in at least 75 
per cent of the years in our sample period. Accordingly, we eliminate 31 firms, i.e. 14 per 
cent of our entire sample. Re-estimating the model specifications using this smaller sample 
yields a larger autoregressive parameter.  
6. Conclusions 
The extensive literature on dividend policy of Anglo-American companies, which builds on 
Lintner  (1956),  shows  that  most  firms  set  long  term  target  payout  ratios.  Changes  in 
dividends are triggered by major unexpected and persistent changes in earnings, and dividend 
changes are avoided if a reversal to the previous dividend level is likely in the short run. 
Consequently, not the level of the dividend level but a change in dividends matters as a signal 
to the market. We examined whether these stylized facts also hold for German firms which 
operate  in  a  totally  different  corporate  governance  regime  which  is  characterized  by 
concentrated control, ownership pyramids, and the representation of banks on the board. To   22
this end, we fit micro models of dividend behaviour to a data set of German industrial and 
commercial quoted firms comprising more than half of all quoted German companies.  
German firms pay out a lower proportion of their cash flows than UK firms. However, on a 
published  profits  basis,  the  pattern  is  reversed,  with  German  firms  showing  significantly 
higher payout ratios. The company law provisions described above partly account for these 
two conflicting results. In contrast to the Anglo-American evidence, German dividends are 
more  volatile,  and  dividend  omissions  and  zero  dividend  payout  policies  occur  more 
frequently. When we use a partial adjustment model to estimate the implicit target payout 
ratio and the speed of adjustment of dividends towards a long run target payout ratio based on 
published earnings, we find that none of our model specifications gives results that are in line 
with the observed payout and speed of adjustment. Our results do not improve when we 
abandon the basic estimation techniques such as OLS or Within-Groups for more advanced 
ones  such  as  GMM-in-differences  or  GMM-in-systems.  The  latter  two  estimation 
methodologies avoid the biases arising from the estimation of unbalanced dynamic panel data 
models with a small number of time periods, a large cross-section of firms and unobserved 
heterogeneity across firms. We find that our model specifications on the relation between 
dividends, and past dividend policy and published earnings show that the estimated speed of 
dividend  adjustment  is  consistent  with  observed  dividend  patterns.  Still,  even  the  GMM 
estimation techniques yield an implicit target payout ratio based on public earnings of around 
25 per cent, which is substantially lower than the observed payout of 86 per cent. Therefore, 
German firms do not base their dividend decisions on long term target dividend payout ratios 
based on public earnings.  
However, the published earnings figure may not correctly reflect corporate performance as 
German firms tend to retain significant part of their earnings to build up legal reserves. Given 
the  conservative nature of published earnings figures, the long term payout ratio may be 
based on cash flows. We do indeed find that the Lintner partial adjustment model yields 
realistic estimation results when cash flows are substituted for published earnings. Both the 
speed of dividend adjustment and the implicit payout ratios are close to our observed results, 
and confirm our prediction that cash flows are economically more meaningful. The implicit 
target payout ratio of 20 per cent is comparable to the observed one of 21 per cent on a cash 
flow basis. Hence, we conclude that dividend payout ratios of German firms are based cash 
flows rather than published earnings. The reason why our partial adjustment models provide 
better results with cash flows than with published earnings results from a higher degree of   23
smoothing of earnings than of cash flows. This is shown by the autocorrelation of published 
earnings which is substantially higher than that of cash flows.  
Regarding the speed of adjustment of dividends towards the long term target payout ratio, 
companies from Anglo-American countries only slowly adjust their dividend policy whereas 
German tend to be more willing to cut the dividend in the wake of a consistent decrease in 
profitability. The German data suggests that there is a high degree of ‘discreteness’ in the 
dividends-per-share time series as opposed to the ‘smoothness’ (i.e., frequent annual small 
adjustments in the dividend per share) observed in the US and the UK.  
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Table 1 
Overall Sample Composition 
Panel A 
Sample Period  1984-1993 
Number of Firms  221 





Number of Records per Firm  Number of Firms 
10  174 
9  13 
8  15 
7  8 
6  9 
5  2 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics on Dividends, Published Earnings, and Cash Flows 
Sample period: 1984-1993. Sample: 221 German industrial and commercial quoted firms. Dividends 
are  gross  dividends  per share. The cash flows are defined as zero distribution earnings gross of 
depreciation  and  changes  in  provisions.  The  par  value  of  all  shares  is  standardized  to  DM  50 
(approximately ￿ 25). The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation of the series 
over its mean.  




Cash Flow per 
Share 
Mean  12.3  14.3  57.6 
Standard Deviation  9.2  15.3  54.6 
Coefficient of Variation  0.75  1.07  0.95 
Median  12.5  12.2  46.4 
Maximum  76.6  684.2  695.7 
Minimum  0  -222.9  -198.5 
Correlation coefficient of 
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Table 3 
Number of Increases, Decreases and Maintained Dividends 
Sample period: 1984 - 1993. Sample: 221 German industrial and commercial quoted firms.  
  Nr of Firm-Year 
Observations 
% of Total 
     
Dividends Maintained  955  50.9% 
Thereof, cases of zero dividends in at       
least two consecutive years  203  10.8% 
Dividends Increased  615  32.8% 
Thereof, Dividend Initiations  65  3.5% 
Dividend Cuts  307  16.4% 
thereof, Dividend Omissions  107  5.7% 
TOTAL  1877  100% 
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Table 4 
Distribution Measures of Percentage Changes 
Sample period: 1984 - 1993. Sample: 221 German industrial and commercial quoted firms.  
* Excluding dividend initiations. 
** Excluding dividend omissions 
  Increases  Cuts 
Mean  
Percentage of Dividend Increases 







Percentage of Dividend Increases 






Standard Deviation  
of Percentage of Dividend Increases 






Number of Dividend Increases 
* / Cuts 
**  550  200 
Nr of Dividend Initiations   65   
Nr of Dividend Omissions    107 
Distribution  
of Size of Dividend Increase 
* / Cut 
** 
   
[0%; 10%] dividend increase / cut  166 (30.2%)  29 (14.5%) 
]10%; 25%]  247 (44.9%)  76 (38%) 
]25%; 50%]  74 (13.5%)  69 (34.5%) 
]50%;75%]  29 (5.3%)  18 (9.0%) 
]75%;90%]  7 (1.3%)  8 (4.0%) 
]90%;100%]  27 (4.9%)   
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Table 5 
Dividend Model with Published Earnings 
Dit is the dependent variable and stands for dividends per share. PP are published earnings per share. 
Time dummies are included in all specifications. m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial  correlation.  The  Sargan  statistic  is  a  test  of  the  over-identifying  restrictions,  asymptotically 
distributed  as  c
2(k)  under  the  null  of  valid  instruments,  with  degrees  of  freedom  (k)  reported  in 
parentheses.  OLS  stands  for  Ordinary  Least  Squares.  WG  stands  for  Within-Group  estimation: 
specifications  (c)  and  (d)  have  variables  expressed  as  deviations  from  the  time  mean.  Variables  in 
specifications (e) and (f) are expressed in first-differences. Specifications (g) and (h) are linear systems of 
first-differenced and levels equations. GMM(DIF) and GMM(SYS) are one-step estimators.  Instruments: 
Specifications (e) and (f): Dt-3... D1 and PPt-3 ... PP1. Specifications (g) and (h) Dt-3... D1 and DDt-2, and 




* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
 
  OLS in Levels  WG  GMM (DIF)  GMM (SYS) 
Variables  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h) 































































-  -0.003 
(0.010) 
  -0.034 
(0.023) 
Time dummies  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
m1  -1.994  -2.248  2.804  3.154  -4.142  -4.108  -4.220  -4.292 
m2  1.638  1.511  3.829  3.822  1.401  1.424  1.475  1.538 
Sargan (d.f.)  -  -  -  -  71 (61)  69 (60)  72 (68)  77 (67) 
Observations  1876  1876  1655  1655  1655  1655  1655  1655 
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Table 6 
Dividend Model with Cash Flows 
Dit  is  the  dependent  variable  and  stands  for  dividends  per  share.  CF  are  cash  flows  per  share.  Time 
dummies are included in all specifications. m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-
order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 
c
2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with degrees of freedom (k) reported in parentheses. OLS stands 
for  Ordinary  Least  Squares.  WG  stands  for  Within-Group  estimation:  specifications  (c)  and  (d)  have 
variables expressed as deviations from time mean. Variables in specifications (e) and (f) are expressed in 
first-differences.  Specifications (g) and  (h)  are linear  systems  of first-differenced and levels equations. 
GMM(DIF) and GMM(SYS) are one-step estimators. Instruments: Specifications (e) and (f): Dt-3... D1 and 
CFt-3  ...  CF1.  Specifications  (g)  and  (h)  Dt-3...  D1,  DDt-2  and  CFt-3  ...  CF1,  DCFt-2.  Standard-errors, 
asymptotically  robust  to  heteroskedasticity, are  reported  in  parentheses.
  ***,
**  and 
* stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  OLS in Levels  WG  GMM (DIF)  GMM (SYS) 
Variables  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h) 





























































-  -0.002 
(0.004) 





Time dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
m1  -1.382  -1.872  3.469  8.381  -4.514  -4.643  -4.655  -4.899 
m2  1.959  1.437  3.996  6.421  1.130  1.250  1.339  1.431 
Sargan (d.f.)  -  -  -  -  63 (61)  64 (60)  76 (68)  70 (67) 
Observations  1876  1876  1655  1655  1434  1434  1434  1434 
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Table 7 
Dividend Model with Published Earnings and Cash Flows Simultaneously 
Dit is the dependent variable in all specifications. It represents dividends per share, PP are published 
earnings per share and CF are cash flows per share. Time dummies are included in all specifications. 
m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan statistic is a 
test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as c
2(k) under the null of valid 
instruments, with degrees  of  freedom  (k)  reported  in parentheses. Specification (b) has variables 
expressed as deviations from time mean. OLS stands for Ordinary Least Squares. WG stands for 
Within-Group  estimation:  variables  in  specification  (c)  are  expressed  in  first-differences. 
Specification  (d)  is  a  linear  system  of  first-differenced  and  levels  equations.  GMM(DIF)  and 
GMM(SYS) are one-step estimators. Instruments: Specifications (c): Dt-3... D1, PPt-3...PP1 and CFt-
3...CF1. Specification (d) Dt-3...D1, DDt-2, PPt-3... PP1, DPPt-2 and CFt-3...CF1, DCFt-2. Standard-errors, 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses.
 ***,
** and 
* stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  OLS in Levels  WG  GMM (DIF)  GMM (SYS) 
Variables  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 





















































Time dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
m1  -2.248  -5.162  -4.755  -4.843 
m2  1.500  1.944  1.476  1.536 
Sargan (d.f.)  -  -  97 (86)  116 (100) 
Observations  1876  1655  1655  1655 
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Table 8 
Summary Results of the Scaled Estimations 
TDit  is  the  dependent  variable  in  all  specifications.  It  represents  total  dividends.  TPP  are  total 
published  earnings  and  TCF  are  total  cash  flows.  Both  variables  are  scaled  by  the  market 
capitalization. Time dummies are included in all specifications. m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) 
under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as c
2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with degrees of freedom (k) 
reported  in  parentheses.  Variables  in  specifications  (a)  and (b) are expressed in first-differences. 
Specifications  (c),  (d)  and  (e)  are  a  linear  system  of  first-differenced  and  levels  equations. 
GMM(DIF)  and GMM(SYS) are one-step estimators. Instruments: Specifications (a): TDt-3...TD1, 
TPPt-3...TPP1; (b) TDt-3...TD1, TCFt-3...TCF1. (c) TDt-3...TD1, DTDt-2, TPPt-3... TPP1, DTPPt-2; (d) TDt-
3...TD1,  DTDt-2  and  TCFt-3...TCF1,  DTCFt-2.  Standard-errors,  asymptotically  robust  to 
heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses.
 ***,
** and 
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  GMM(DIF)  GMM(SYS) 
Variables  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 






















-  0.056 
(0.050) 
TPPi,t-1  -0.040 
(0.031) 
-  -0.031 
(0.027) 
-  -0.010 
(0.044) 


















m1  -5.062  -5.005  -4.832  -4.931  -5.068 
m2  0.676  0.266  0.628  0.346  0.481 
Sargan (d.f.)  64.0 (53)  55.5 (53)  77.6 (67)  73.9 (67)  110.8 (100) 
Observations  1655  1655  1655  1655  1655 
 
 
 